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1. INTRODUCTION
Investment funds offer significant opportunities to sponsors and
investors. During the past few years, the industry for creatively struc-
tured investment funds has grown rapidly worldwide." Such funds in-
clude buy-out and venture capital funds, mezzanine funds, index-linked
funds, commodity futures funds, property funds, and various income
funds. In practice, this is a complex area that involves difficult tax and
other legal questions. A fund typically seeks to raise capital from inves-
tors in a large number of jurisdictions. Funds then typically make in-
vestments in a range of jurisdictions. A fund must therefore be struc-
tured so as to reconcile, as best as possible, conflicting tax treatments
and other legal requirements in the relevant jurisdictions.
Organizing structured investment funds has not been popular in
Japan. Restrictive regulations have been blamed for such unpopularity.
Japanese regulators, aware of the necessity of addressing this criticism,
have begun to move toward deregulation. Thus, in the near future,
structured investment funds are expected to flourish in Japan, despite
the complexity associated with deregulation.
This article examines the regulatory environment for structured
investment funds in Japan. Part I describes the Japanese legal frame-
work within which structured investment funds can be organized, oper-
ated, and marketed. Part I also explores the current Japanese Securities
and Exchange Law and the recent legislation on commodity futures
funds. Part II identifies some characteristics of the Japanese regulatory
process, with a focus on the enforcement of current statutes and the
drafting of new legislation. Part II then analyzes why those characteris-
tics may be unique to Japan. Part II examines the process in which
various special interests compete in the interpretation of current stat-
utes and in the introduction of new legislation. Part II investigates
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whether this process produces a "race for the bottom." Part II also
explores the formalism dominating the application of the relevant stat-
utes in this area and the impact of such formalism. This article argues
that the competition among ministries and industries tends to enhance,
rather than undermine, investors' welfare in Japan. Part III briefly
predicts the future of Japanese regulation in the structured investment
fund area and beyond.
2. PART I: THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
2.1. Organizational Form and Taxation
At the outset, a brief discussion of organizational form and tax
treatment may be helpful. In general, a fund will not appeal to pro-
spective investors, if investing through the fund results in a higher tax
liability than direct investment. The fund's sponsor and advisers, there-
fore, attempt to structure the fund so as to obtain tax neutrality.
There are several legal forms available in Japan. For instance, a
partnership (kumiai) has tax transparency, but usually this organiza-
tional form does not appeal to investors because it does not enjoy lim-
ited liability.' Nevertheless, this form is somewhat popular for venture
capital funds in Japan. Also, some real property funds are organized as
partnerships and marketed as tax shelters to a limited number of
wealthy Japanese investors.
A Japanese counterpart of the limited partnership organizational
form commonly used in the United States and elsewhere is a
tokumeikumiai,3 which enjoys tax transparency. The Japanese Na-
tional Tax Administration, however, adopted a rule which imposes
withholding tax when the number of limited partners, or
tokumeikumiaiin, becomes ten or more.4 As a result, this organizational
form becomes costly, once the fund is marketed to a large number of
investors.
A fund organized in the corporate form is costly. Corporations are
always subject to double taxation in Japan. There is no exception to
2 See MINPO (Civil Code), Law No. 89 of 1896 and Law No. 9 of 1898 arts. 667-
88 (Japan)(describing the organizational rules on kumiai), reprinted in Civil Code of
Japan, II Law Bull. Series Japan (EHS) FA 110-13 (1988)(English translation).
I See SHOHO (Commercial Code), Law No. 48 of 1899 arts. 535-42 (Ja-
pan)(describing the organizational rules on tokumeikumiai), reprinted in Commercial
Code & Audit Special Exception Law of Japan, II Law Bull. Series Japan (EHS) JA
144-45 (1979)(English translation) [hereinafter SHOHO].
' See Income Tax Law of Japan, Law No. 33 of 1965 art. 210 (as
amended)(Japan), reprinted in Income Tax Law of Japan, IV Law Bull. Series Japan
(EHS) CA 293 (1989)(English translation)[hereinafter Income Tax Law]; Income Tax
Ordinance, Ordinance No. 96 of 1965 arts. 288, 327 (Japan).
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this precept, unlike in the United States where some corporations enjoy
single-tiered taxation (e.g., investment companies and real estate invest-
ment trusts).5 Moreover, Japanese corporate law generally prohibits re-
payment of the invested monies to the shareholders, unless the corpora-
tion adopts a strict procedure for capital reduction or the corporation
liquidates.6 Thus, investors may encounter hurdles in liquidating their
investments, unless an active secondary market is developed.
From a tax perspective, a trust is attractive. A trust enjoys tax
transparency.' A trust agreement may provide for an investor's limited
liability, although this issue is unresolved in the Japanese legal commu-
nity. An investment fund employing a trust, however, is unpopular in
Japan for several reasons. First, the Japanese Trust Business Law
(Shintakugyoho)8 and the practice under this law have effectively lim-
ited access to the trust business. In practice, only eight Japanese banks
and several foreign trust banks may engage in the trust business.9 A
license must be obtained to serve as a trustee, and the regulator, the
Ministry of Finance ("MoF"), has adopted a policy that separates the
trust business industry from other financial services industries.
Second, current Japanese law is generally silent with respect to
trusts that have a large number of beneficiaries, except for loan trusts
and securities investment trusts, which are specifically recognized and
regulated by special statutes.10  The Japanese Trust Law
(Shintakuho)11 is also silent in regard to trust certificates. With the
exception of loan trusts and securities investment trusts, the issuance of
' See I.R.C. §§ 851-55, 860 (1988)(United States federal tax provisions concern-
ing single-tiered taxation for certain investment companies); id. at §§ 856-60 (United
States federal tax provisions concerning single-tiered taxation for certain real estate
investment trusts). See also Kanda & Levmore, Taxes, Agency Costs, and the Price of
Incorporation, 77 VA. L. REv. 211, 245 (1991).
See SHOHO, supra note 3, arts. 375-80, 404-56, at JA 103-05, 111-26.
See Income Tax Law, supra note 4, art. 13, 1, at CA 34-35; Corporation Tax
Law of Japan, Law No. 28 of 1947 art. 12, 1, reprinted in Corporation Tax Law of
Japan, IV Law Bull. Series Japan (EHS) DA 14-15 (1988)(English translation).
S Trust Business Law, Law No. 65 of 1922 (as amended)(Japan), reprinted in
Japanese Laws Relating to Trust Company, V1 Law Bull. Series Japan (EHS) CA 1
(1988)(English translation).
I Seven Japanese trust banks, one Japanese "ordinary" bank, and nine foreign
banks have been licensed to engage in the trust business. See FEDERATION Or BANKERS
ASSOCIATIONS OF JAPAN, THE BANKING SYSTEM IN JAPAN 14-16 (1989).
10 See Loan Trust Law, Law No. 195 of 1952 (as amended)(Japan), reprinted in
Japanese Laws Relating to Trust Company, VI Law Bull. Series Japan (EHS) CB 1
(1988)(English translation); Securities Investment Trust Law, Law No. 198 of 1951
(as amended)(Japan), reprinted in Japanese Laws Relating to Trust Company, VI
Law Bull. Series Japan (EHS) CC 1 (1988)(English translation)[hereinafter SITL].
" Trust Law, Law No. 62 of 1922 (as amended)(Japan), reprinted in Japanese
Laws Relating to Trust Company, VI Law Bull. Series Japan (EHS) CD 1
(1988)(English translation).
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negotiable trust certificates has not been attempted under the Japanese
Trust Law.
Third, aside from loan trusts and securities investment trusts, a
unit or beneficial interest in a trust fund is not a security under the
Japanese Securities and Exchange Law ("SEL")."2 Consequently,
there is no law to protect investors in this area. This does not mean
that marketing a fund in the trust form is prohibited. In theory, one
may market such a fund subject to general theories of contract law.
Nevertheless, financial institutions, aware of the MoF's concern for in-
vestor protection, have not tried to sell such a product to the general
public. It is important to mention that securities firms may not handle
a product that is not a security under the SEL. Non-financial institu-
tions, such as trading companies, leasing companies, and real estate
companies, whose primary regulator is not the MoF, might attempt to
sell such a trust-form investment fund to the general public. However,
if these institutions are reporting companies under the SEL, they are
subject to the MoF's jurisdiction. Thus, given the current lack of statu-
tory protection for investors, the MoF would ambitiously discourage
such an activity by these reporting non-financial institutions.
2.2. The Framework of the Securities and Exchange Law
The marketing of investment funds is primarily regulated by the
SEL. The creation and operation of such funds are only regulated
when special statutes, such as the Securities Investment Trust Law and
the Law for Commodity Investment Business, are applicable. The SEL
was modeled on the United States federal securities laws, specifically
the Securities Act of 1933" and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.14
The SEL provides two basic sets of rules for investor protection:
mandatory disclosure and anti-fraud rules.
There are several important differences between the legal systems
of Japan and the United States. First, in Japan, a firm must obtain a
license from the MoF to serve as a broker-dealer of securities.1" The
12 Securities and Exchange Law, Law No. 25 of 1948 (as amended)(Japan), re-
printed in Japanese Laws Relating to Securities and Exchange & Foreign Securities
Dealer, VI Law Bull. Series Japan (EHS) MA 1 (1987)(English transla-
tion)[hereinafter SEL]. See infra notes 16-17 and accompanying text for a discussion of
"security" under the SEL.
13 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a (1988).
14 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1988).
15 See SEL, supra note 12, art. 28, at MA 34. When Japanese regulations re-
quire the procurement of a license for certain activities, such a license must be obtained
from the relevant minister, not the ministry. Also, various reports required under the
regulations must be presented to the minister, not the ministry. Thus, a license for
security business must be obtained from the Minister of Finance and a registration
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entry barrier to this intermediary service is thus higher in Japan than
in the United States, where registration, rather than licensing, is re-
quired to serve as a broker-dealer.
Second, while the notion of a security is broadly defined in the
United States,"6 it is quite limited in Japan. The SEL defines a secur-
ity as one of the following items:
(1) government bonds;
(2) local government bonds;
(3) bonds issued by a juridical person in accordance
with a special law;
(4) secured or unsecured debentures;
(5) investment certificates issued by a juridical person
established under a special law;
(6) share certificates (including odd lot; hereinafter the
same), or certificates representing subscription right to new
stocks;
(7) beneficiary certificates of securities investment trust
or loan trust;
(8) securities or certificates issued by foreign countries
or foreign juridical persons, which are of the same nature as
those mentioned in the preceding respective items;
(9) other securities or certificates prescribed by Cabinet
Order. 7
Although the MoF is empowered to designate any new instrument as a
security under item 9, it has never exercised this power. In Japanese
practice, the definition of a security is limited.
Third, the distinction between a public offering (which is subject
statement for a new securities issue must be filed with the Minister of Finance, as well.
"6 The Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1988), defines the term secur-
ity as:
any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness,
certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, col-
lateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, trans-
ferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of de-
posit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other
mineral rights, any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any security,
certificate of deposit, or group or index of securities (including any interest
therein or based on the value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or
privilege entered into on a national securities exchange relating to foreign
currency, or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a
"security", or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or
interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to
subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.
"7 SEL, supra note 12, art. 2, 1, at MA 2.
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to mandatory disclosure requirements) and a private placement (which
is not) differs between the two countries. Japan adopts more formalistic
criteria than the United States in differentiating a public offering from
a private placement. The SEL defines a public offering with two basic
notions: (1) an offer is made to "many and unspecific persons" 18 and
(2) the offer has uniform terms. 19 An interpretive release promulgated
by the MoF declares that an offer is made to "many and unspecific
persons" if the number of offerees is about fifty or more.2 0 In practice,
the MoF's release is "interpreted" to provide a definitive criterion of
fifty or more persons.
The fourth difference between United States and Japanese securi-
ties law is that by utilizing the notion of a security, the Japanese SEL
links its investor protection rules to Article 65 of the SEL (a rule simi-
lar to the United States' Glass-Steagall Act of 1933),21 which essen-
tially prohibits banks from engaging in the securities business.2 This
regulatory structure is known as the "one-set structure" in Japan and
is the key to understanding past and future developments in the regula-
tion of new financial instruments in Japan. If a financial product is a
security, as defined by the SEL, investors enjoy the protection of the
SEL, while banks are prohibited from handling such a product. Article
43 of the SEL prohibits securities firms from dealing with a product
other than a security unless they obtain special permission from the
MoF.23 If a product is not a security, banks may handle it, while secur-
ities firms may not, and investors receive no legal protection from the
SEL.
The MoF, in response to the long battle between the banking and
28 Id. art. 2, 3, at MA 3.
19 Id.
20 RELEASE ON HANDLING DISCLOSURE OF THE FIRM'S CONTENTS, MINISTRY
OF FINANCE RELEASE No. 2272 §§ 2-1, 2-2-2 (Sept. 6, 1971)(as amended)[hereinafter
RELEASE ON HANDLING DISCLOSURE]. In practice, this interpretative release is relied
upon when interpreting the notion of "many and unspecific persons" in other statutes.
21 Glass-Steagall Act, 12 U.S.C. § 227 (1988).
22 SEL art. 65, % 1 provides:
No bank, trust company or such other financial institutions as prescribed
by Cabinet Order shall engage in any of the acts enumerated in each item
of Article 2 paragraph 8: Provided that, this shall not apply in such cases
wherein a bank buys and sells securities upon a written order of and in
the account of a customer, or a bank, a trust company or other financial
institution as may be prescribed by Cabinet Order buys and sells securities
for the investment purpose or in the account of a trustor based on trust
contract in accordance with the provisions of other laws.
SEL, supra note 12, art. 65, 1, at MA 51. Article 65, % 2 of the SEL permits banks
and other certain financial institutions to engage in securities business with government
securities and futures and options related to such securities. Id. art. 65, % 2, at MA 51.
23 Id. art. 43, at MA 40-41.
[Vol. 12:4
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol12/iss4/4
STRUCTURED INESTMENTS
securities industries, placed priority on the issue of which industry han-
dles each new product over the issue of investor protection. For exam-
ple, the MoF adopted a policy that permits both banks and securities
firms to handle commercial paper.24 Securities firms received special
permission to handle commercial paper as an intermediary service
under Article 43 of the SEL.2" Meanwhile, the banking industry suc-
cessfully persuaded the MoF to exclude securities firms from interme-
diary services for residential mortgage trusts and securitized bank loans.
To obtain these results, the MoF did not designate these transactions as
securities; the MoF treated them as non-securities, which banks may
deal with under the SEL.
The above approach resulted in the absence of legal protection for
investors. To remedy this situation, the MoF took two actions. First, it
had special legislation enacted to protect investors. For example,
teitoshoken, or mortgage deed, is in this category.26 Second, by rule or
administrative guidance, the MoF mandated that banks (and securities
firms with respect to commercial paper) not sell these products with a
unit value of less than one hundred million yen. The purpose of this
limitation was to prevent the sale of such products to the general pub-
lic, which is in need of the protection provided by the securities law.
Commercial paper and residential mortgage trusts are in this category.
Certificates of deposit are also in this category, but the "minimum unit
rule" has been liberalized for this instrument.27
The SEL's narrow definition of "security" has been strongly criti-
cized. 28 As previously noted, the MoF took two actions in regard to
non-securities to protect investors. New legislation, however, has enor-
mous costs; for example, hundreds of new statutes must be passed, and
"I See Litt, Macey, Miller & Rubin, Politics, Bureaucracies, and Financial
Markets: Bank Entry into Commercial Paper Underwriting in the United States and
Japan, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 369 (1990)(a detailed analysis of the introduction of com-
mercial paper in both Japan and the United States) [hereinafter Politics].
2 SEL, supra note 12, art. 43, at MA 40-41.
10 See Law for Regulating Business on Mortgage Deed, Law No. 114 of 1987
(Japan).
"' The minimum unit amount is 50 million yen. The assumption is that issuers of
certificates of deposit, or banks, are subject to stricter regulation than issuers of other
instruments, such as commercial paper and residential mortgage trust certificates. See
RELEASE ON HANDLING CERTIFICATES OF DEPOSIT, MINISTRY OF FINANCE RE-
LEASE No. 650 (May 30, 1979)(this release is a package of twelve releases). This pic-
ture is incomplete without mentioning the battles and interactions between the Banking
and Securities Bureaus within the MoF. See generally Aoki, The Japanese Bureau-
cracy in Economic Administration: A Rational Regulator or Pluralist Agent?, in
GOVERNMENT PoLIcy TOWARD INDUSTRY IN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN 265
(J. Shoven ed. 1988)(an interesting analysis of the Japanese bureaucracy).
"' See, e.g., Takeuchi, Shokentorihikihojono Yukashoken (Securities under the Se-
curities and Exchange Law), in SHOKENTORIHIKIHO TAIKEI 21 (1986)(in Japanese).
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no new financial product may be sold until corresponding legislation is
enacted. The "minimum unit rule" disqualifies new financial products
from potential sale to small investors, thereby hindering the develop-
ment of secondary markets and raising initial financing costs. In short,
many people who deal with Japanese "non-security securities" are
waiting for fundamental reform of the SEL. In this context, the Funda-
mental Research Committee of the Securities and Exchange Council at
the Securities Bureau of the MoF has been considering a complete
overhaul of the SEL since 1988.29
It is difficult to predict the modifications that the current SEL will
undergo. Perhaps the notion of a security should be expanded to cover
any investment and the rules for investor protection should be separated
from Article 65. The Fundamental Research Committee is unlikely to
accept this position because of the political differences between the
many ministries and industries. I predict that the Japanese definition of
a security will be extended to some extent.
2.3. Regulation of Securities Investment Trusts
A securities investment trust is regulated by the Securities Invest-
ment Trust Law ("SITL").30 The sponsor, labelled as the settlor of the
trust in Japan for regulatory reasons, must obtain a license from the
MoF and serve as a manager of the trust fund. The MoF also must
approve the trust deed. Because of this substantive regulation, a unit of
the trust fund is an "exempted security" under the SEL to which the
disclosure requirements of the SEL do not apply."1 This type of fund
may. invest primarily in securities, as defined by the SEL. SITL explic-
itly prohibits any other form of a trust for pooled investment in securi-
ties, if the fund is marketed to "many and unspecific persons.""2 For
the past few years, trust banks have offered a "fund trust" to their
corporate customers. In the fund trust arrangement, customers transfer
money to the trust bank, and the bank, as trustee, invests in securities.
The trust bank industry maintains that the fund trust does not violate
the SITL prohibition, because the fund's structure does not allow units
to be marketed to "many and unspecific persons."33
29 See SECURITIES & EXCH. COUNCIL, How BASIC SYSTEM REGARDING CAPI-
TAL MARKET OUGHT TO BE REFORMED (June 19, 1991).
SO SITL, supra note 10.
s SEL, supra note 12, art. 2, 1(7), at MA 2; id. art. 3, at MA 6.
32 SITL, supra note 10, art. 3, at CC 2; see SEL, supra note 12, art. 2, 3, at
MA 3.
" SEL, supra note 12, art. 2, T 3, at MA 3.
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2.4. Other Statutes
Two other statutes are worth noting briefly. First, the Law for
Prohibition of Acceptance of Money Deposit and Related Activities
(Shusshiho)s4 generally prohibits anyone from receiving monies with a
promise of subsequent repayment, in a fixed amount, from "many and
unspecific persons.""
Second, Japanese criminal law prohibits gaming or gambling."8 If
investors promise to buy a unit of a highly speculative fund, they, as
well as the fund's sponsors, may violate this statute, unless there is
another statute, such as one for certain futures and options, explicitly
permitting such a high-risk investment.
2.5. Funds Organized Outside Japan
When one seeks to create an investment fund outside Japan, a
critical question is how one can market it to Japanese investors under
Japanese law. If one wants to sell off-shore fund units to investors in
Japan, the answer largely depends upon whether such units are "secur-
ities," as defined by the SEL.
If a unit is a security, a license from the MoF is required in order
to sell that unit as a broker-dealer in Japan. In other words, only se-
curities firms can sell "securities." Further, Article 65 of the SEL pro-
hibits banks from intermediary services. 7 When a foreign institution
wants to serve as a broker-dealer of a security, it must set up a separate
vehicle or a branch in Japan. Each branch must be licensed by the
MoF pursuant to the Law Concerning Foreign Securities Dealer. 8 A
banking institution may create a securities branch, if it organizes an
affiliate outside Japan. The bank's ownership of the affiliate may not
exceed fifty percent, and the affiliate must enter Japan with a branch.
A foreign firm that lacks a broker-dealer license may execute transac-
tions with Japanese investors only if. (1) no solicitation is involved and
(2) the transactions are with licensed broker-dealers or with other "ex-
3' Law for Prohibition of Acceptance of Money Deposit and Related Activities,
Law No. 195 of 1954 (Japan), reprinted in Japanese Laws Relating to Trust Com-
pany, VI Law Bull. Series Japan (EHS) EN 1 (1988)(English translation).
35 SEL, supra note 12, art. 2, 3, at MA 3.
36 See KEIHO (Penal Code), Law No. 45 of 1907 ch. 23, arts. 185-86 (Japan),
reprinted in Penal Code of Japan, II Law Bull. Series Japan (EHS) PA 37
(1988)(English translation).
11 SEL, supra note 12, art. 65, at MA 51.
31 Law Concerning Foreign Securities Dealer, Law No. 5 of 1971 art. 3 (as
amended)(Japan), reprinted in Japanese Laws Relating to Securities and Exchange &
Foreign Securities Dealer, VI Law Bull. Series Japan (EHS) MC 3 (1987)(English
translation).
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empted" entities, as specified under the Law Concerning Foreign Se-
curities Dealer. Finally, the mandatory disclosure and anti-fraud rules
of the SEL apply. For instance, if one sells units to "many and un-
specific persons," the issuer of the units must file a registration state-
ment with the MoFs'
If a unit is not a security, anyone may sell it in Japan. Securities
firms, however, must obtain special permission from the MoF in order
to sell such units.40 Those who engage in intermediary services may
also be asked to obey the "minimum unit rule," particularly when their
primary regulator is the MoF.4 1 It is unclear what penalties are in-
volved if this rule is violated.
An off-shore investment fund unit is a security, if it satisfies the
requirement of Article 2, paragraph 1(8) of the SEL.4" For most in-
vestment funds today, there are three "routes" by which a unit is
deemed to be a security. First, it may have the characteristics of a bene-
ficial certificate of a securities investment trusi. This is relatively rare
because a securities investment trust is narrowly defined. A securities
investment trust must be in the trust form and it must invest in securi-
ties. Second, such a unit may have the characteristics of a corporate
debt security. Finally, the unit may have the characteristics of corporate
stock.
Legal form, rather than economic substance, prevails in Japan. If,
therefore, an off-shore fund is organized as a corporation, the units of
such a fund are normally characterized as debt securities or as shares.
These units are treated as securities in Japan. If the organizational
form of the fund is a trust or a limited partnership, the unit is not a
security. If one wants to sell such a non-security through securities
firms in Japan, one must obtain special permission from the MoF, pur-
suant to Article 43 of the SEL.4" Traditionally, the MoF's decision to
issue such permits has been a function of the competition between the
banking and securities industries. Recently, however, the MoF seems
more willing to issue such permits, in part because the MoF is actively
liberalizing the wall between the two industries. For example, in the
Fall of 1990, a securitized product of credit card receivables, which was
organized in the United States in the trust form, was brought into Ja-
pan. Several foreign and Japanese securities firms successfully obtained
s See SEL, supra note 12, art. 2, T 3, at MA 3.
40 See id. art. 43, at MA 40-41.
41 See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text for a discussion of the "minimum
unit rule."
42 SEL, supra note 12, art. 2, 1(8), at MA 2.
43 Id. art. 43, at MA 40-41.
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special permission from the MoF to sell this product in Japan.
Two additional observations are worthwhile. First, the regulatory
environment for futures and options differs from that described above.
For futures and options, a product's classification as a security under
the SEL is unimportant. The SEL applies to securities-related futures
and options through a route other than Article 2, paragraph 1.4" Two
other statutes also regulate futures and options. One is the Financial
Futures Trading Law, which regulates currency and interest futures
and options. The other is the Commodity Exchange Law,46 which reg-
ulates commodity futures and options.
The existence of three separate statutes regulating futures and op-
tions in Japan simply reflects the divisions among the regulators47 and
the respective industries that seek "protection" by the regulation. At
any rate, it is important to note that rules on futures and options are
different from the rules on "physicals." For instance, foreign firms
which do not have a broker-dealer license are not permitted to execute
futures or options transactions with Japanese investors, even if no solic-
itation is involved.
Second, anti-gambling laws also pose a concern with respect to the
marketing of off-shore funds to Japanese investors.
2.6. Legislation on Commodity Futures Funds
In May of 1991, new legislation was introduced in Japan to regu-
late commodity futures funds, which are known as commodity pools in
the United States. This law, the Law for Commodity Investment Busi-
ness, 4 has an interesting history. In 1990, when trading companies and
leasing companies found off-shore commodity futures funds to be at-
tractive for marketing to Japanese investors, these companies success-
44 See id. art. 2, 8, 13, at MA 3-4. This complicated structure was adopted to
allow banks and securities firms to engage in intermediary business. See supra notes
24-27 and accompanying text.
4' Financial Futures Trading Law, Law No. 77 of 1988 (Japan).
41 Commodity Exchange Law of Japan, Law No. 239 of 1950 (as amended), re-
printed in Commodity Exchange Law of Japan, VI Law Bull. Series Japan (EHS)
MM 1 (1986)(English translation).
41 In Japan, most bills are submitted to the Diet by the Cabinet. For each bill,
there is a "sponsoring" ministry or bureau of a ministry, which drafts the statute and
then, once the legislation is passed, administers the statute. Sometimes two ministries
jointly sponsor a bill. The SEL is "governed" by the Securities Bureau of the MoF.
The Financial Futures Trading Law is sponsored by the Banking Bureau of the MoF.
The Commodity Exchange Law is jointly governed by the Ministry of Agriculture,
Forestry and Fisheries ("MAFF") and the Ministry of International Trade and Indus-
try ("MITI"). The MAFF has jurisdiction over agricultural commodities and the
MITI over non-agricultural ones.
'" Law for Commodity Investment Business, Law No. 66 of 1991 (Japan).
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fully persuaded the Ministry of International Trade and Industry
("MITI") to launch a project for special legislation.49 The MITI first
contemplated legislation with the same statutory structure as the
United States' Commodity Exchange Act,5 0 which regulates the com-
modity pool operator, the sponsor in this field. However, the draft pre-
pared by the MITI encountered strong opposition from the MoF.
51
The MoF rejected the statutory approach directly regulating com-
modity pool operators on the grounds that the business of such opera-
tors consists of financial services. Such a business is similar to the func-
tions of sponsoring or settlor companies'of securities investment trusts,
except in this instance the fund invests in commodity futures instead of
securities. The MoF also noted that it would be expanding the defini-
tion of a "security" under the SEL. 2 The MoF further stated that
units of investment funds, including commodity futures funds, should
be subject to the same regulations in order to enhance investor protec-
tion. The MoF argued that economic substance should control and that
such funds should be regulated by the SEL, under the MoF's jurisdic-
tion.53 Moreover, the MoF contended that when financial institutions
participate in the commodity futures fund business, either as a sponsor
or as a seller of the units, they should be subject to their home regula-
tor, that is, the MoF.
5 4
This battle between the MITI and the MoF resulted in the
MITI's abandonment of the legislation that would directly regulate the
sponsor of commodity futures funds. In its place, a compromise was
developed. The compromise legislation was jointly sponsored by the
MAFF, the MITI, and the MoF. Consequently, its regulatory struc-
ture is highly complex.
55
In creating this legislation, an initial practical assumption was
made by the drafters. This assumption stipulated that there are two
legal types of commodity futures funds: the contract type and the trust
type. The former is typically organized in the limited partnership
"' Since certain agricultural commodities belong to the MAFF's jurisdiction, it is
accurate to state that the MITI and the MAFF attempted to introduce new legislation.
In practice, however, the MAFF is unimportant in the commodity futures fund area
and it did not play an important role in the enactment of the new legislation. The
MAFF will not be elaborated upon in this article.
51 Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
" See Note, Shohin Fund Hoan Kimaru (A Bill for Commodity Funds Com-
pleted), 68 SHIHONSHIJO 46 (1991)(in Japanese) [hereinafter Note].
52 See SEcuRrrIEs & EXCH. COUNCIL, supra note 29.
51 See Note, supra note 51.
" See id.
15 Until a detailed set of ordinances and rules is promulgated by the ministries,
the exact contents of the compromise legislation will remain unknown. Such promulga-
tion has not occurred at the time of this writing.
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form.5" The latter is generally structured in the trust form.57 On this
assumption, the new legislation was structured to impose licensing re-
quirements -and other supervisory and "conduct-of-business" regula-
tions- on the seller of the fund and the adviser for the fund. The scope
of the seller's permissible activities is broadly defined so as to include
fund organizing and sponsoring; however, such activities are permissi-
ble only for the contract type fund. For the trust type fund, if a trading
company or leasing company, for instance, obtains an adviser-license
and employs a trust bank as trustee for the fund, the trading company
or leasing company can manage the fund by entering into a manage-
ment contract that requires the trustee to follow the adviser's invest-
ment directions. For both fund types, if a trading company or leasing
company obtains a seller-license, it can market the fund under the su-
pervisory and "conduct-of-business" regulations of the Law for Com-
modity Investment Business and the rules to be promulgated by the
MITI."8 The units of the fund, however, are not "exempted securities"
under the current SEL. The SEL is triggered, if the units fall within
the SEL's definition of "security.
59
Financial institutions, such as banks, trust banks, securities firms
and sponsoring companies of securities investment trusts, are exempt
from the applicable licensing requirements under the Law for Com-
modity Investment Business. Thus, these institutions may serve as sell-
ers or advisers without a license. This exemption from the licensing
requirements for financial institutions stems from the fact that these
institutions are subject to their "home" regulation of the MoF. How-
ever, the MoF is expected to promulgate a detailed set of supervisory
rules and "conduct-of-business" regulations, under the Law for Com-
modity Investment Business, to regulate the activities of these exempt
financial institutions.
3. PART II: CHARACTERISTICS OF JAPANESE REGULATION
3.1. The Process of Legislation and Administrative Rulemaking
The Japanese legal environment for structured investment funds,
described in Part I, suggests several characteristics of the legislative and
so See Hara, Shohin Fund no Genjyo to "Shohin Toshi nikakaru Jigyo no Kisei
nikansuru Horitsu" no Gaiyo (Present State of Commodity Funds and the Overview of
the Law for Commodity Investment Business), 1288 KINYUHOMUJIJYO 22 (1991)(in
Japanese). A corporate type fund did not receive much attention because of its unpopu-
larity due to tax disadvantages.
57 See id.
See id.
, See SEL, supra note 12, art. 2, % 1, at MA 2.
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administrative rulemaking processes of Japan. While it may be univer-
sally accepted that various special interest groups compete in most leg-
islative and administrative rulemaking processes, the entire Japanese
political environment in which private interest groups and regulators
interact might be viewed as unique to Japan. As shown earlier, the
treatment of "non-security securities" under the SEL might look famil-
iar at first glance; the banking and securities industries competed and
the MoF served as a mediator. The battle resulted in the classification
of new financial instruments as "non-security securities" under the
SEL, which enabled the banking industry to enter the market. To in-
sure investor protection, the MoF actively intervened either by making
special legislation or by promulgating new rules or administrative guid-
ance. The MoF's action can be viewed as a function of the battle be-
tween special interest groups. The promulgation of administrative
guidelines that create the "minimum unit rule" for certain public offer-
ings of "non-security securities" represents a victory for the securities
industry to the extent that the rule is applied and effectively enforced.
Public investors suffer to the extent that "non-security securities" with
small investment units are not available in the marketplace.
An important customary "rule" exists in Japan. That is, the non-
existence of an "explicit" legal rule endorsing a certain activity under
explicit regulatory conditions is understood to mean that such activity is
prohibited in Japan. When no explicit rule exists as to whether a par-
ticular new instrument -such as a negotiable certificate representing
the beneficial interest of a trust (other than a loan trust or securities
investment trust)-is treated as a security under the SEL or if the rules
are unclear, institutions do not invent and market such instruments.
Put differently, until a consensus is reached on a financial device, fol-
lowed by a lengthy process for establishing an explicit rule or adminis-
trative guideline, virtually no one creates or markets such a financial
instrument.
In the case of commodity futures funds, it is easy to see why the
MITI sought to introduce new legislation to "deregulate" the area.
One common explanation is that the introduction of new means of in-
vestment in commodity futures enhances public investors' welfare. An-
other explanation for the MITI's conduct is found by examining the
interests of trading companies and leasing companies. These companies
did not want to violate the "no-rule-means-prohibition" rule. Instead,
these companies persuaded their regulator, the MITI, to "regulate"
them. The real estate industry did not join this chorus, simply because
its regulator is the Ministry of Construction ("MoC") and not the
MITI. The MITI's plan encountered strong opposition from the MoF,
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which apparently received support from the securities and banking in-
dustries. The result was a compromise.
The originally proposed statutory structure, under which pool op-
erators would be subject to regulation solely within the jurisdiction of
the MITI (and not the MoF), was abandoned. But as a practical mat-
ter under the new legislation, trading companies and leasing companies
could operate commodity futures funds by obtaining a seller-license
from the MITI. Financial institutions could operate such funds without
a license from the MITI, but they would be subject to any additional
requirements that the MoF promulgates. Beyond the area regulated by
the new legislation, which is narrower in its scope of application than
the originally proposed draft, the "no-rule-means-prohibition" rule
controls. Until the MoC introduces new legislation, the real estate in-
dustry is left unregulated and subject to the "no-rule-means-prohibi-
tion" rule during the transitional period. The MoC is expected to draft
new legislation for property investment funds in the near future. A bat-
tle with the MoF appears likely.
It is important to mention that there is no litigation in this area in
Japan. All relevant parties participate in the administrative rulemaking
and legislative processes. Once an accord is reached, it is unlikely that
such an accord will be challenged before a court. When a dispute is
resolved by introducing new legislation, it may be difficult and costly to
judicially attack such legislation. Likewise, judicial challenges against
administrative rulemaking are also rare. However, the lack of judicial
challenges in this area may initially seem puzzling, but in fact, this
circumstance can be readily explained.
The "special interest theory" of legislation is well-established in
the United States.60 For instance, it has been argued that the United
States' Glass-Steagall Act,6" which separates the banking and securities
businesses, stems from the special interest of the investment banking
industry, rather than from the public interest.2 However, the exact ef-
fect competing private interests have on the final product of legislation
has not been studied in depth. It might be difficult to prove that when
legislation is the product of a battle among multiple competing private
60 See generally Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.
L. ECON. 211 (1976); Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELLJ. EcoN. &
MGMT. Sci. 3 (1971), revised and reprinted in G. STIGLER, THE CmIZEN AND THE
STATE: EssAYs IN REGULATION (1975).
:1 Glass-Steagall Act, 12 U.S.C. § 227 (1988).
62 See Macey, Special Interest Groups Legislation and the Judicial Function:
The Dilemma of Glass-Steagall, 33 EMORY L.J. 1 (1984).
6 See, e.g., Rubin, Law and Legislation in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM.
L. REv. 369, 369-70 (1989).
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interests, a more beneficial result is attained for the general public. The
Japanese legislation on commodity future funds, however, protects in-
vestors to the extent that it is coupled with the Japanese "no-rule-
means-prohibition" rule under the SEL, though this is not the best
solution.
In the United States over the past few decades, federal agencies
have shifted the bulk of their activities "from case-by-case adjudication
to general rulemaking proceedings in order to develop administrative
policy." While it is well-known in the United States that administra-
tive rulemaking is more vulnerable" to judicial challenge than adminis-
trative adjudication,6 5 the reverse is true in Japan. Indeed, in Japan,
administrative adjudication has sometimes been litigated, 6 but no one
has challenged a rule that was created through a lengthy decision-mak-
ing process in which all relevant parties participated.
The complicated and time-consuming decision-making process that
accompanies legislation and administrative rulemaking in Japan may
be viewed as a "monitoring" system of the conduct or activities covered
by the legislation or administrative rulemaking. Parties with multiple
interests who participate in the process serve as ex ante monitors, while
parties who litigate legislation or administrative rules serve as ex post
monitors. Since ex ante monitoring exists, it is not surprising that there
are virtually no judicial challenges to legislation or administrative rules
in Japan.
It is difficult to determine, as a general matter, whether ex post
monitoring is more costly than ex ante monitoring.6 However, ex ante
monitoring has certain advantages. First, while competing ministries
and private industries seek to further their own interests, a compromise
will often be reached, when a norm enhancing public interest is devel-
oped. Second, ex ante negotiation may mean that the cost of uncertainty
is not borne by investors. Thus, in Japan, investors can choose from
stable alternatives. In contrast, a system that does not have ex ante
monitoring offers more choice and more innovation, but at a cost.
One might ask whether there is anyone who directly represents
public investors in the Japanese legislative and administrative rulemak-
" Stewart, Vermont Yankee and the Evolution of Administrative Procedure, 91
HARV. L. REv. 1805, 1811 (1978). See generally, Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking
or Adjudication in the Development of Administrative Policy, 78 HARv. L. REv. 921
(1965).
e See Stewart, supra note 64, at 1810.
6 For instance, administrative adjudication of the Fair Trade Commission has
often been litigated in Japan.
87 See generally Politics, supra note 24 (presenting a theory on the preclearance-
postclearance distinction in regard to the commercial paper market).
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ing processes. Japanese custom provides that the decision-making pro-
cess at the ministry level is accompanied by a lengthy discussion at an
advisory council (shingikai).8 The advisory council is organized at the
ministry and some of its participants are selected as representatives of
public investors. Although the primary purpose of the advisory council
is to accommodate the competing interests among the relevant private
industries, the interests of public investors are considered, at least to
some extent, through certain advisory council representatives.
Viewed in this light, the "no-rule-means-prohibition" rule makes
sense in Japan. Conduct that is subject to this rule, such as marketing
negotiable trust certificates, has not received the scrutiny of the ex ante
monitoring process. Thus, if one pursues such conduct, it is likely to be
monitored ex post, perhaps by litigation or by some other social sanc-
tion. Ex post monitoring may be undesirable in Japan.
The dominance of administrative rulemaking over administrative
adjudication also makes sense in Japan. Less ex ante monitoring exists
in an administrative adjudication, because the number of participants in
the adjudication process is limited. Further, ex post litigation might be
costly. Thus, the Japanese favor general administrative rulemaking,
when it is coupled with ex ante monitoring.
3.2. Formalism in Administrative Rulemaking
The MoF's rules and guidelines under the SEL are formal. The
legal norm for a particular activity or conduct consists of complex for-
mal rules. As was described in Part I, in the context of differentiating
between a public offering and a private placement, the term "many and
unspecific persons" is interpreted to be fifty or more persons, irrespec-
tive of whether the offerees can "fend for themselves."69 The "mini-
mum unit rule" for certain "non-security securities" is simply one hun-
dred million yen. Under the SEL, the determination as to whether
units of an investment fund are treated as securities depends on the
legal form of the fund. If the fund is organized as a corporation, the
units are securities; however, if the fund is organized in the trust form,
the units are not securities. Emphasizing legal form over economic sub-
stance often creates loopholes. The Japanese formalism in administra-
tive rulemaking appears bewildering.
Since an administrative branch of government is often better
equipped to gather and evaluate information in the development and
implementation of a policy as compared to a judicial branch of govern-
68 See id. at 409 n.138.
69 See RELEASE ON HANDLING DISCLOSURE, supra note 20, at §§ 2-1, 2-2-2.
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ment, one might expect that an administrative branch prefers to enforce
substantive rules instead of formalistic rules. In Japan, the reverse is
true.
In the United States, extensive studies have been conducted that
analyze how an administrative branch or administrative agency of the
government chooses among multiple means in developing and imple-
menting a policy goal.70 However, studies have not focused on whether
these groups prefer to enforce formalistic rules. Japan's tendency to
favor formalistic rules may be better understood by focusing on the
rulemaking process in Japan.
First, at the political level, a legal norm for a particular activity or
conduct consists of complex formalistic rules. These rules represent the
compromise that was reached during the rulemaking process. Each for-
malistic rule is easy to observe. The participants in the rulemaking pro-
cess may clearly indicate each "point" in order to specify the conces-
sions made to each participant.
Second, a legal norm with multiple formalistic rules may with-
stand a subsequent judicial challenge better than a substantive norm
would withstand such a challenge. Judges are better equipped to make
a substantive inquiry as it pertains to a particular case. Further, judges
may not want to involve themselves in the hard task of dealing with a
complex mixture of formalistic rules. This in turn might discourage
litigation.
Third, at the theoretical level, formalistic rules might better fit ex
ante monitoring than substantive rules. If the legal norms or constituent
rules are of a substantive nature, future activities or conduct might be
difficult to identify ex ante. Consequently, ex ante monitoring may be-
come extremely difficult and ineffective. Formalistic rules help ex ante
monitors to identify future activities and conduct during the rulemaking
process, which facilitates the development of a final legal norm.
4. PART III: THE FUTURE OF JAPANESE REGULATION
Capital markets are becoming international. As such, it is no sur-
prise that institutions -mostly trading companies and leasing compa-
nies- have tried to market structured investment funds that are organ-
ized and managed outside Japan to Japanese investors. Indeed, one of
the purposes of the new legislation on commodity futures funds was to
70 See Shapiro, supra note 64. See also Scholz, Cooperative Regulatory Enforce-
ment and the Politics of Administrative Effectiveness, 85 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 115
(1991).
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"deregulate" the marketing activities associated with such funds by lift-
ing the "no-rule-means-prohibition" rule. Therefore, "deregulation"
was achieved through regulation. As the market for structured invest-
ment funds becomes international, it is possible that the traditional reg-
ulatory environment in Japan, which, as analyzed in Part I, appears
sensible in isolation, may gradually change. These changes may arise in
response to differences in the regulatory environments of various coun-
tries. Such differences might prevent worldwide investment fund activi-
ties and place a country that has a strict or unique regulatory environ-
ment in an unfavorable competitive position. The increased need for
regulatory cooperation in the international financial services area, such
as in the enforcement of insider trading regulations, may influence the
Japanese regulators toward a more universal standard in administering
and enforcing their policies in structured investment funds. In fact, the
MoF is considering a somewhat comprehensive overhaul of the SITL
in order to cope with the international trends of deregulation and
harmonization. 7
Thus, the regulatory environment in Japan may change in the fu-
ture as a result of foreign competitive pressures. Over time, Japan's
lengthy legislative and administrative rulemaking processes may unfa-
vorably impact Japan's competitive edge. Japan's political and eco-
nomic responses to rapidly changing global environments in the finan-
cial services area may lag behind competitors. If Japan seeks to move
with greater speed in this area, the analysis advanced in Part II sug-
gests that the ex ante monitoring mechanism associated with the legisla-
tive and administrative rulemaking processes will gradually disappear.
Ex post monitoring mechanisms will appear as a substitute for ex ante
mechanisms. If such a shift does not rapidly occur, it might reinforce
the argument that ex ante monitoring mechanisms are efficient.
5. CONCLUSION
This article has examined the Japanese regulatory environment
for structured investment funds. The restrictive nature of this environ-
ment, as evidenced by the provisions of the SEL and the new legislation
for commodity futures funds, reflects the underlying political landscape
in Japan, that is, the competition among ministries and private indus-
tries. It is difficult to evaluate whether public investors are victimized
in this political environment. It is sensible to have the ministries and
private industries compete for their best interests, rather than allowing
71 See SEcURITIEs & EXCH. COUNCIL, supra note 29, at 6.
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public interest to control the political environment. Moreover, since this
process can be viewed as an ex ante monitoring mechanism through
legislation and administrative rulemaking, the argument can be made
that this regulatory environment tends to enhance, rather than dimin-
ish, investors' welfare. The internationalization of the capital markets
will probably affect this distinguishing characteristic of Japanese regu-
lation. Yet, from a theoretical perspective, future changes in the Japa-
nese regulatory environment might not be a surprise, if one subscribes
to the notion of ex ante monitoring mechanisms embedded in the legis-
lative and administrative rulemaking processes. To the extent that the
ex ante monitoring mechanisms may be phased out, new ex post moni-
toring mechanisms may well emerge in Japan.
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